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KUTV, INC., Deseret News Publishing 
Company, KSL AM and TV, a Division 
of Bonneville International Corpora-
tion, and Society of Professional 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah 
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HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, District 
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MEMORANDUM OF RESPONDENT HONORABLE 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original petition for extraordinary writ 
to vacate an order of the district court entered against the 
press during a criminal trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming the 
order of the district court which restricted the press from using 
the term "Sugarhouse rapist" during the trial of Ronald Dale 
Easthope. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1981, Ronald Dale Easthope was 
arrested and charged with aggravated sexual assault. 
On the day of his trial, February 3, 1982, prior 
to impaneling the jury, the Honorable Dean E. Conder held 
a final hearing in camera on certain defense motions (R. at 
165-174). At that hearing Judge Conder ordered that the term 
"Sugarhouse" not be used in the trial by either counsel or 
witnesses, nor that the defendant's criminal record be 
alluded to during the trial (R. at 167) . Defense counsel 
mentioned the "considerable amount" of pre-trial publicity 
(R. at 165), and Judge Conder found that the epithet "Sugar-
house Rapist" was "commonly known" (R. at 167) . Judge Conder 
denied a defense motion to sequester the jury (R. at 165). 
At the end of the victim's testimony, Judge Conder 
held another in camera hearing (R. at 254-258) . The defense 
moved to have the press restricted, for the brief period of the 
trial only, from using the epithet "Sugarhouse Rapist" (R. at 
254-255) . The motion was granted (R. at 254) . Upon further 
defense motion the court ordered the press not to refer to "Mr. 
Easthope's activities prior to the trial that would in any way 
show his involvement with the law." (R. at 255). 
The order was released immediately after a verdict 
was returned and the jury polled (R. at 650) . 
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The epithet "Sugarhouse Rapist" had been created 
several years before, and used extensively by the press to 
describe an unknown assailant believed to be responsible 
for a series of apparently related rapes in the Sugarhouse 
area of Salt Lake City. Later, in 1971, Mr. Easthope was 
arrested and convicted of two of the rapes attributed to 
this "Sugarhouse Rapist." Around the time of his trial on 
the two rape charges, the news media referred to Mr. Easthope 
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist." From arrest, until the first day 
of Mr. Easthope's current criminal trial for aggravated 
sexual assault, the news media referred to Mr. Easthope 
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist." See exhibit A to brief 
of KSL, and footnote 1 on page 4 of the brief of KUTV, for 
examples. The press also alluded to the numerous rapes 
attributed to the "Sugarhouse Rapist" in the past, but which 
were never proven to have been corrunitted by Mr. Easthope. 
During the course of the trial Mr. Easthope testified 
in his own defense (R. at 557-596). While the jury was informed 
of Mr. Easthope's two prior rape convictions, the jurors were 
not informed that Mr. Easthope was the person branded by the 
news media as the "Sugarhouse Rapist." The jury was also not 
informed of the unproven innuendos that Mr. Easthope had 
perpetrated the other rapes attributed to this "Sugarhouse 
-3-
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Rapist." The news media was ready to use the prejudicial 
brand during the current trial. Petitioner KUTV's 
memorandum at page 4. 
Mr. Easthope was found guilty of aggravated 
sexual assault and was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of five years to life in prison. 
I 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
IS NOT ABSOLUTE: 
A. WHERE IT THREATENS A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL; 
B. WHERE IT PRESENTS A CLEAR AND 
PRESENT DANGER OF INTERFERING 
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE; AND 
C. WHERE THE ALLEGEDLY PROTECTED 
SPEECH CONSISTS OF A MERE 
INFLAMMATORY EPITHET. 
A 
Whenever two or more Constitutional rights come 
in conflict, it is difficult, but necessary, to decide which 
of the two rights must bow and which shall be dominant. 
This Court has found thtat it is difficult to resolve the 
tension which occurs when freedom of the press conflicts 
with the right to a fair trial. In re Modification of 
canon 3A(7), 628 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1981). 
-4-
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The United States Supreme Court has held that freedom 
of the press, under some circumstances, dominates over other 
Constitutional rights. For example, in Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (hereafter Cox), cited by 
petitioner KUTV at page 10 and petitioner KSL at pages 14 and 
15, the United States Supreme Court held that a rape victim's 
right to privacy under the specific facts of that case was 
not sufficient to allow criminal or civil sanctions to be 
applied against a reporter who published a victim's name. 
Cox is inapposite to the case at bar. A decisive factor in 
the court's conclusion therein was that the expectation of 
a right to privacy is small when the information in dispute 
is already public: 
[T]he prevailing law of invasion of 
privacy generally recognizes that the 
interests in privacy fade when the 
information involved already appears on the 
public record. 
Id. at 494-495. 
In the present case, rights to a fair trial, rights 
to liberty are concerned, not rights to privacy in matters 
everyone knows anyway. It is enlightening to note that the 
court did not ever rule that rights to privacy may never, under 
any circumstance, outweigh freedom of the press. 
The leading case, dealing with a confrontation 
between the First Amendment and a criminal defendant's right 
-5-
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to a fair trial, is Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539 (1976) (hereafter Nebraska Press). The order appealed 
from in Nebraska Press prohibited (1) reporting of events 
occurring at an open preliminary hearing, and (2) all facts 
"strongly implicative" of the accused. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the press can report what occurs at 
a trial and that the second part of the order was too vague 
and broad to survive scrutiny. But, in Nebraska Press the 
Court refused to hold freedom of the press superior to a 
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial: 
ITJhe petitioners would have us 
declare the right of an accused subordinate 
to their right to publish in all circumstances. 
But if the authors of these guarantees, fully 
aware of the potential conflicts between them, 
were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue 
by assigning to one priority over the other, 
it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution 
by undertaking what they declined to do. It 
is unnecessary, after nearly two centuries, 
to establish a priority applicable in all 
circumstances. Yet it is nonetheless clear 
that the barriers to prior restraint remain 
high unless we are to abandon what the Court 
has said. . . . 
Id. at 561. 
In Nebraska Press, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically held that where lengthy pretrial periods are 
concerned, there must be a factual, case by case analysis of 
the propriety of using orders against the press to insure a 
-6-
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defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court then presented 
a standard by which courts could decide the merits in 
proposed, lengthy, pretrial orders against the press: 
We turn now to the record in this 
case to determine whether, as Learned 
Hand put it, "the gravity of the 'evil,' 
discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger." !Citations omitted.] 
To do so, we must examine the evidence before 
the trial judge when the order was entered to 
determine (a) the nature and extent of pretrial 
news coverage; (b) whether other measures would 
be likely to mitigate the effects of 
unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how 
effectively a restraining order would operate 
to prevent the threatened danger. The precise 
terms of the restraining order are also 
important. 
Id. at 562. 
The clear holding in Nebraska Press that the freedom 
of the press is not absolute, and that a case by case analysis 
is appropriate if a person's liberty is at stake has never 
been overruled or modified. Thus only an analysis of the 
specific facts will determine, in this case, which constitu-
tional right is paramount. See Point II below for that 
analysis. 
-7-
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B 
In Marshal v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) 
(hereafter Marshal) the United States Supreme Court found that 
news reports of suppressed evidence which were heard by jurors 
were prejudicial. As in the present case, the news accounts 
in Marshal included the defendant's prior record and allega-
tions of other, unrelated wrongdoing. The Court held: 
We have here the exposure of jurors 
to information of a character which the trial 
judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not 
be directly offered as evidence. The 
prejudice to the defendant is almost certain 
to be as great when that evidence reaches the 
jury through news accounts as when it is a part 
of the prosecution's evidence Icitation omitted]. 
It may indeed be greater, for it is then not 
tempered by protective procedures. 
Id. at 312-13. 
In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (here-
after Pennekamp) , Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion 
stated: "The right to undermine proceedings in court is not 
a special prerogative of the press." Id. at 364. In 
Pennekamp, the United States Supreme Court considered a 
contempt citation issued against the press. The court held 
that such citations are correct and proper if the speech used 
by the press presented a "clear and present danger" to the 
administration of justice. Id. at 334. 
-8-
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To allow court ordered restrictions, the press 
commentary must concern pending litigation. The purpose 
of the "clear and present danger rule" as it applies to the 
administration of justice was explained in Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941): 
The very word "trial" connotes 
decisions on the evidence and arguments 
properly advanced in open court. Legal 
trials are not like elections to be 
won through the use of the meeting-hall, 
the radio, and the newspaper." 
Id. at 271. 
In the instant case, Judge Conder found that use of 
the brand "Sugarhouse Rapist" would be "highly prejudicial" 
during the brief trial period (R. at 254) . He so feared the 
prejudicial impact thereof that he ordered counsel and 
witnesses not to use even the word "Sugarhouse" alone (R. at 167) . 
The fears and prejudice engendered by use of 
"Sugarhouse Rapist" do not stem from the charge at trial but 
from earlier, unrelated events. Use of the "Sugarhouse Rapist" 
injects new improper material into the present case which 
does not concern the present case at all. If a juror heard 
that Mr. Easthope was alleged to be this infamous "Sugarhouse 
rapist" of the past, that alone could inflame and prejudice 
the juror. 
-9-
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Before Mr. Easthope was first charged with any of 
the rapes attributed to the "Sugarhouse Rapist," the epithet's 
use was part of a very emotional situation. An atmosphere of 
extreme fear existed in the sugarhouse area. 
During his recent trial, a clear and present 
danger existed that the news media's resurrection of the 
epithet, and its use in connection with Mr. Easthope would 
arouse and inflame hatred, and would prevent the court from 
administering justice to Mr. Easthope, who was charged with 
a separate, very serious crime. Judge Conder did not order 
the press never again to use the appellation. The court 
order only imposed six days of restriction during which Mr. 
Easthope could receive justice. After the verdict was 
announced the press could sensationalize again all they 
wanted. 
Because the use of "Sugarhouse Rapist" would have 
presented a clear, palpable danger of prejudicing the jury, 
Judge Conder was correct in ordering the press not to use 
the epithet until after verdict was reached. 
-10-
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c 
In addition to the need to analyse facts and 
circumstances where two constitutional rights conflict; many 
forms of speech and expression have no constitutional protection. 
Examples are words creating a clear and present danger of 
thwarting the administration of justice, libel and slander, 
obscenity, fighting words, speech harming the national security, 
etc .. 
The United States Supreme Court has often tried to 
distinguish real, protectable expression, that is, the exposition 
of ideas and thoughts, from words or expressions which do not 
rise to the level of cormnunication of information~ 
For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942) the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question whether 
"fighting words" were protected speech. The court held they 
were not: 
It has been well observed that such utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality. 
Id. at 572. 
This rule; concerning "fighting words", was best stated 
in Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U~S. 296, 309-310 (1940) where 
the court declared~ 
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Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not 
in any proper sense communication of information or 
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.~ .• 
Id. at 309-310 (Emphasis added) 
An epithet is defined in Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary as "a characterizing word or phrase accompanying or 
occurring in place of the name of a person or thing; or a 
disparaging or abusive word or phrase." (Emphasis added). 
The appellation 11 Sugarhouse Rapist'' falls clearly within the 
definition of an epithet. "Sugarhouse Rapist" does not convey 
in£orrnation about Mr~ Easthope~ It brands Mr. Easthope by 
innuenCbas that person responsible for numerous rapes he was never 
convicted of. The stigma attached to the epithet, if it reached 
the jury, would be highly inflammatory and prejudicial. 
The order of Judge Conder strove to prevent something 
far worse than a breach of the peace through "fighting words". 
Judge Conder's order was tailored to avoid the mere use of an 
epithet that could violate Mr~ Easthope's Constitutional right to 
a fair trial and result in the loss of his freedom for from five 
years to the rest of his life. The news media was free to attend 
and repo!:'t all the proceedings and convey all "information" during 
Mr. Easthope's trial for aggravated sexual assault. The 
challenged order's only purpose was to keep sensationalistic 
journalism from branding Mr. Easthope with an epithet which could 
deny to Mr. Easthope a fair, objective trial. 
-12-
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II 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT IN QUESTION WAS 
REASONABLE, NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT, AND M..7\NDATED BY THE NEED FOR A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
Balancing the precise terms of the district court's 
order between the First and Sixth Amendments results in 
affirmance of the lower court's decision. 
The terms of the order were minimally restrictive. 
The press could attend the trial. The press was not barred from 
being present* The press could report on any facts or information 
developed at the trial. They were only ordered not to brand the 
defendant as the "sugarhouse rapist"; a term which the court 
found was "highly prejudicial"o (R.. at 254) 
The duration of the order was minimal. The order went 
into effect on the first day of trial and was released as soon 
as the jury verdict was rendered and the jury polled. (R. at 650) 
The court had not restricted the press in any manner in its pre-
trial publicity. In fact, the press had used the term "sugarhouse 
ra_pist" in referring to Mr. Easthope often before trial. (R. at 
165; pet. KUTV Memo at 4 n. l; Pet. KSL Memo. Exh. A) 
The court had every indication that the press would 
brand Mr. Easthope as the "sugarhouse rapist" during the trial. 
The press had done so during pre-trial stages of the case. The 
pre-trial publicity had been described as "considerable". (R. at 165) 
-13-
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P~titioners had refused to follow their own voluntary principles 
and guidelines concerning pre-trial publicity, which guidelines 
state that prior record and prior charges should not be publicized 
pre-trial. See below at 15-16. 
The epithet "sugarhouse rapist" is not a part of the 
exposition of ideas, nor information entitled to constitutional 
protection. The term is a characterization, a slur, a brand, an 
epithet. It is a fictitious nomenclature for an unknown person 
who may or may not have committed all of the rapes attributed 
tc him. It is a term for sensationalizing news accounts and 
increasing publicity. 
The epithet "sugarhouse rapist 11 was highly inflammatory. 
The judge found the term "highly prejudicial," and indeed it was. 
The further order of the court not to publicize the prior contacts 
with the law was only an afterthought to ensure that not only the 
letter but also that the spirit of the first order would not be 
violated. 
A real and substantial liberty interest was at stake. 
Mr. Easthope was an ex-convict who would almost assuredly go to 
prison for at least five years and perhaps for life, if convicted. 
In balancing all of the factors, we have on one hand an 
order of brief duration, which did not limit attendance or reporting 
of the trial, which did not limit pre-trial publicity, which limited 
only the branding or characterizing of the defendant about matters 
-14-
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of a highly inflammatory nature which preceded the subject matter 
of this trial by several years and which related to unproven 
charges the press desired to attribute to Mr. Easthope. 
On the other hand, we have only the press' desire for sensationalism, 
for prejudicial publicity, for slurring. 
In May, 1980, a special committee was empanelled by the 
Utah State Bar which promulgated Standards and Guidelines for 
news reporting of criminal and other proceedings~ The Guidelines 
were "published and distributed" as "Principles and Guidelines 
for news reporting" by six organizations including KUTV News, 
KSL TV News, Deseret News and the Utah State Bar. Committee 
members included Michael Beardsley, an agent OID Petitioner KUTV 
Inc.; Ernest Ford, an agent of petitioner KSL;and William Smart, 
an agent of Petitioner Deseret News. Admittedly the Standards 
and <9uidelines are "voluntary", and "do not necessarily reflect 
in all respects what the members of the ·~·· news media believe 
would be permitted or required by law". 
Id. at 1. Therefore, respondent cannot argue that petitioners 
are estopped from asserting some right to publicize the material 
in question. However, the Guidelines do state: 
Id. at 1. 
These Gtiidelines are intended to reflect 
standards that are a re·as·ona.b1e. means of 
accommodating, on a voluntary basisF the 
correlative constitutional rights of free 
speech and free press with the right of an 
accused to a fair trial. 
-15-
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Id. at 4. 
Under "prior convictions" the guidelines read: 
Prior criminal charges and convictions 
are, in some areas, matter of public record 
and in some instances may be available to the 
news media through police agencies or from 
court records. Such information is inadmissible 
on the question of guilt and pretrial publication 
may jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial 
and therefore, should be avoided. 
Although the guidelines are not legally binding, being 
voluntary, they are factually significant in that they show to 
the court that petitioners and the press recognize that even pre· 
trial publicity can affect the outcome of judicial proceedings, 
let alone publicity during the trial itself. They also reflect 
to a judc;e, that if the news media voluntarily feels it should 
avoid the less dangerous pre-trial publicizing of prior charges 
and convictions, then the publicizing thereof should be avoided 
even more during the so critical trial period. The fact that the 
press had refused to follow its own guidelines concerning Mr. 
Easthope indicates to a judge that they will likely not refrain 
from use of "Sugarhouse Rapist" during trial. 
Pre-trial press publicity is less likely to prejudice 
than trial publicity. Jury voir dire can weed out people who 
have been exposed to too much pre-trial publicity, or who have 
been influenced thereby. However, a juror who hears prejudicial 
material during trial cannot be weeded out. Thus, a weighing 
and balancing of constitutional rights concerning trial publicity 
should not require as strict a scrutiny as a consideration 
concerning pre-trial publicity. 
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But even if we use the pre-trial publicity test in 
Nebraska Press, supra, the order of Judge Conder was appropriate. 
We have already .analyzed ''the precise terms of the 
restraining order" and the "nature and extent of pre-trial news 
coverage". There remains the question of how effectively the 
order would prevent the threatened danger. The only likely way 
the jurors could be infected with petitioners' desired, 
inflarmnatory characterization, would be through the media itself. 
The order would undoubtedly be effective, and indeed was 
effective in stopping the threat of prejudice. 
The last prong in the Nebraska Press pre-trial publicity 
test is to weigh all less restrictive measures. 
One could argue that ordering the jurors not to read 
or listen to news accounts concerning the trial would be sufficient. 
The judge did make such orders, but felt they were insufficient; 
otherwise, he would not have entered his order .to the 
press. 
The current state of the art of news reporting is such 
that people cannot be assured that news will only be presented 
at certain known times of the day. Almost daily,newsbreaks on 
radio and television suddenly occur, with extremely brief news 
updates of local and national significance~ Jurors could not be 
r. assured of avoiding news accounts of the trial even if they quickly 
turned off a television set when a newsbreak appeared; or refrained 
from watching all of the regularly scheduled news. The headlining 
is too quick and succinct. 
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In addition, if the general public were aware of the 
press' brand of Mr. Easthope during the trial, jurors might well 
be informed of the characterization of Mr. Easthope in casual 
conversation. A juror could easily be asked about his /her jury 
duty, or volunteer that the juror is participating in a rape trial, 
at which time a party to the conversation might question whether 
it was the trial of the "sugarhouse rapist, 11 which that person 
knows, from the news media; is occurring. 
Although-not in the record, a recent capital homicide 
case is illustrative of the very distinct possibility of the above 
inadvertent discovery of inf larmnatory press insinuation and 
innuendo. In the trial of Ervil Lebaron, a conscientious juror, 
under the same type of order as in the present case not to read 
or listen to news accounts of the trial, was accidentally tainted 
with knowledge of prior, unproven innuendos perpetrated by the press 
A young grandson or other young relative of the juror, knowing 
that the juror was involved in the LeBaron trial, after hearing a 
news report, ran in to tell the juror that LeBaron had killed seven 
other people in the past. As a result thereof, Judge Banks could no· 
proceed with the penalty phase of the trial and sentenced LeBaron 
to life imprisonment. 
A change of venue would have been useless. Petitioners 
KUTV, KSL, and Deseret News have a state-wide circulation. Without 
leaving the state of Utah, it would be impossible to escape the 
effects of their use of the epithet "sugarhouse rapist 11 •• 
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Merely to continue the trial would also have been 
an exercise in futility. Whenever the trial did occur, it 
would still be newsworthy, and the press would be ready to 
act. The interest of the press in their journalistic creation 
"sugarhouse rapist" had lasted ten years, clearly showing that 
no reasonable continuance would avoid prejudicial publicity. 
A final alternative would have been to sequester 
the jury. It is true that many courts have favored sequestra-
tion. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In more 
recent cases, the alternative of sequestration has been 
shown to suffer numerous flaws. In Sacramento Bee v. U.S. 
District Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981), the court 
found that preparing to sequester the jury involved 
mechanical complications that would hamper the trial 
and: 
would mean in effect, putting 
the jury in prison, in effect putting 
them in a posture in which there will 
be deep resentment against the court, 
and perhaps the defendant in this 
matter, having results which will be 
unpredictable, but clearly serious. 
Id. at 480. 
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Beyond the influence on the jury and the mechanical 
complications, sequestration is a heavy burden to be imposed 
financially upon the county. State v. Allen,373 A.2d 377, 
381 (N.J. 1977). Court administrators have found that a twelve 
person jury costs the state at least $1,500 to $1,800 per diem 
to sequester. Commonweal th v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318, 348 (PA.·1980). 
The expense and prejudice caused by sequestration are 
heavy. These must not be balanced against the news media's 
right to publish the facts of the trial, which was never in 
question. The press would have the state and Mr. Easthope 
shoulder these burdens so the news media may use an epithet, 
"made for publicity", that would be adverse to the defendants' 
right to a fair trial (R.at 255). 
One could argue that the court could have allowed the 
news media a completely free hand in its characterizations and 
slurs, and if the jury did become prejudiced, a new trial could 
be granted. This alternative is unreasonable for two reasons. 
First, a tainted juror could be timid and not reveal 
the taint. 
Second, the alternative of a re-trial is not really a 
very viable alternative. The United States Supreme Court 
has said: 
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The costs of failure to afford a fair 
trial are high~ In the most extreme cases, 
like Sheppard and Estes, the risk of in-
justice was avoided when the convictions 
were reversed. But a reversal means that 
justice has been delayed for both the 
defendant and the State; in some cases, 
because of lapse of time re-trial is 
impossible or further prosecution is 
gravely handicapped~ Moreover, in border-
line cases in which the conviction is not 
reversed, there is some possibility of 
an injustice unredressed. 
Nebraska Press at 555. 
In balancing First and Sixth Amendment rights under 
the present circumstances, the order of Judge Conder was reasonable, 
fair and appropriate. Even if the Nebraska Press test for pre-
trial publicity is used, the result is the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The freedom of the press is not absolute. Where it 
comes in conflict with other constitutional rights, courts must 
balance and weigh the interests of each such right. In balancing, 
the interest of the.press in characterizing and branding the 
criminal defendant in the trial below is far outweighed by 
the brief, narrow order of the court issued to protect the right 
to a fair trial. The use of the term "sugarhouse rapist" was a 
mere epithet, and was not a part of the "exposition of ideas" 
protected by the First Amendment. The use of the term presented 
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a clear and present danger of interfering with the 
administration of justice. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1982. 
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Attorney General 
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